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The systematic examination of how social psychological phe-
nomena can be informed by neuroscience methodologies, and
how our understanding of neural function can be informed
by social psychological research, began approximately 20 years
ago. Increased interest in these topics largely coincided with
methodological advances in electroencephalography (EEG) and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The desire to
understand how and where the world around us is represented in
the brain (and vice versa) ultimately spawned a field of research
that is thriving today: social neuroscience.
Many early social neuroscience studies were concerned with
the basic question of where social-oriented phenomena are rep-
resented in the brain. While these studies were obviously of
paramount importance for the development of the field, more
recently this approach has been likened to modern day phrenol-
ogy by critics. It is important to note, however, that these early
studies were necessarily constrained by methodological and ana-
lytical approaches of the time. As these methodological and
analytical approaches have evolved, so too has the field of social
neuroscience. The ability to assess how different neural regions
interact on the order of milliseconds has been particularly impor-
tant for enhancing our understanding of both the complexity
of the brain and the complexity inherent in any given social
interaction or social perceptual process.
This second phase of social neuroscience, which focuses less
on where things are happening in the brain and more on how
regions of the brain form networks that interact to engen-
der a psychological process, is poised to have a big impact on
existing theories in social psychology. The notion that many
different neural regions necessarily interact almost instanta-
neously and continuously throughout a given cognitive process
seems perfectly sensible from a neuroanatomical perspective,
but the ramifications this perspective has for prevailing the-
ories in social psychology are pronounced. For instance, take
the dual process perspective, i.e., the theory that many, if not
all, social cognitive processes (e.g., attitudes, prejudice, attri-
butions, etc.,) are uniquely influenced by implicit\automatic\
fast\subconscious processes that occur outside of an individu-
als’ conscious awareness and are uncontrollable, and explicit\
controlled\slow\conscious processes that an individual has con-
scious access to and can control. According to the dual process
account, implicit and explicit processes are orthogonal to one
another.
From a social neuroscience perspective this would suggest
some kind of neuroanatomical distinction between implicit and
explicit processes as well. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest
some functional and neural specificity with regards to implicit
and explicit processes. For example, the amygdala has been
linked to many implicit social processes such as automatic
stereotype activation and perceptions of facial trustworthiness
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Todorov and Engell, 2008; Forbes et al.,
2012a,b). The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) appears to be integral
for regulating implicit processes and fear conditioned responses,
particularly those associated with visceral arousal stemming from
the medial temporal lobe, within the context of current goal
states (e.g., regulating negative stereotype activation or extin-
guishing learned fear responses, Soliman et al., 2010; Forbes
et al., 2012a,b). As the OFC is highly interconnected with regions
in the medial temporal lobe like the amygdala and lateral pre-
frontal cortical regions such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), the functional specificity of the OFC with regards
to implicit processing again seems perfectly logical (Rolls and
Grabenhorst, 2008). Likewise, as DLPFC is considered a hub
for executive function and conscious control of behavior and
thoughts, the DLPFC must play an integral role in explicit pro-
cesses in general such as the generation of explicit attitudes
and beliefs, and conscious perceptions of others. Indeed, a bevy
of social neuroscience studies implicate this region in explicit
social cognitive processes specifically (e.g., Richeson et al., 2003;
Cunningham et al., 2004; Forbes andGrafman, 2010; Forbes et al.,
2012a,b).
Where the waters become much murkier so-to-speak, is when
one considers the time at which these processes unfold. A fun-
damental assumption of dual-process theories is that time is
one of the critical determinants of whether social cognition is
influenced by implicit or explicit processes. Whereas implicit
processes (and products of these processes) occur when indi-
viduals make perceptions or decisions quickly, explicit pro-
cesses can only manifest when one has ample time. This
assumption, however, is not consistent with known anatomi-
cal and neural conductive properties, where functionally dis-
tinct regions of the brain are highly interconnected with one
another and neural propagation of action potentials can occur
on the order of 0.5–50ms within the cortex (Fuster, 1997;
Buzsaki, 2006). How then can we disentangle the undoubtedly
complex relationships inherent in the psychological interplay
between implicit and explicit processes? Possibly via assessing
interactions between neural correlates that represent these psy-
chological processes (e.g., assessing how the temporoparietal
junction and medial PFC, two regions thought to be inte-
gral for theory of mind, interact to influence theory of mind
processes).
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ASSESSING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NEURAL REGIONS
Gaining a better understanding of how neural regions integral for
implicit or fast cognitive processing (e.g., the amygdala or ante-
rior cingulate cortex), interact with regions integral for explicit
or slower cognitive processing (e.g., lateral PFC regions; although
note that PFC activations likely precede many routine/well-
rehearsed daily life activities suggesting the timing of PFC acti-
vation is context dependent) early and often during the social
informational processing stream can provide valuable insight in
to the extent to which any specific social process is influenced
by implicit and explicit social cognitive processes (Figure 1). One
way this can be achieved is by examining the degree to which
collections of neurons in different regions of cortex fire at a spe-
cific rate (i.e., frequency) and in synchrony with one another, i.e.,
by performing coherence analyses. A growing body of evidence
indicates that coherence between two neural regions reflects the
degree to which they are communicating with one another (Engel
and Singer, 2001; Buzsaki, 2006; Siegel et al., 2011, 2012). This
communication, in turn, has been associated with more effica-
cious cognitive processing, e.g., working memory, encoding, and
error detection (Cavanagh et al., 2009; Benchenane et al., 2011),
and top–down modulation of visual and working memory net-
works by prefrontal cortex (Zanto et al., 2011). While it is impor-
tant to stress that coherence between regions depends at least
in part on sustained networking as opposed to transient bind-
ings, the effects of enhanced coherence between distant regions on
behavior can occur almost instantaneously and throughout the
information processing stream. Such observations directly con-
tradict what one would expect if implicit and explicit processes
are orthogonal to one another.
FIGURE 1 | Diagram of direct neural connectivity between regions
critical for implicit and explicit social cognitive and moral judgment
processes. Solid bi-directional arrows denote direct reciprocal neural
connectivity between two regions within a given processing system, i.e.,
implicit or explicit processing. Dashed bi-directional arrows represent
direct reciprocal connectivity between two regions typically involved in
either implicit or explicit processing. Green colored circles denote neural
regions that are typically involved in more implicit cognitive processing.
Red colored circles signify neural regions that are typically involved in
explicit cognitive processing. These regions are not exclusively involved in
implicit or explicit processing, however. This conjecture is represented by
the three shaded boxes and large arrow on the right. The lightest gray
box represents neural regions, namely the amygdala here for the sake of
simplicity, that are largely involved in implicit processes. Likewise, the
darkest gray box highlights neural regions largely involved in explicit
processes. The medium shaded box represents regions that have been
shown to be recruited during both implicit and explicit processing. PFC,
prefrontal cortex.
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Findings from the fMRI literature, which utilizes ever-evolving
analytic strategies to examine the functional connectivity between
different neural regions (He et al., 2011), are also adding to our
understanding of the complexity of the social brain. These ana-
lytic strategies are changing our perceptions of the functions
of the brain from one where distinct neural regions perform
uniform tasks independent of context to one that emphasizes
the dynamic properties of each region that differentially inter-
act with one another as a function of context. For instance,
individuals with egalitarian motivations can successfully down-
regulate amygdala activation in response to novel black faces via
increased dorsolateral PFC activity in stereotype neutral contexts
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Forbes et al., 2012a). When negative
black stereotypes are primed specifically, however, i.e., the context
in which the faces are presented has been altered such that novel
black faces might be perceived in a negative stereotypic manner,
amygdala activation is not down-regulated, even when individ-
uals are given more time to process the faces. Instead, amygdala
activation persists in to explicit processing speeds and initiates a
dynamic interaction between the OFC andDLPFC that ultimately
engenders stereotype-consistent perceptions of novel black faces
(i.e., participants report seeing more angry black faces compared
to white faces, even though all faces had neutral expressions;
Forbes et al., 2012a). Importantly, the interaction between these
regions normally thought to be uniquely involved in implicit and
explicit processing occurs regardless of whether faces are pre-
sented subliminally or supraliminally; a finding that again speaks
against the argument that implicit and explicit social cognitive
processes are orthogonal to one another.
HOW GENETIC POLYMORPHISMSMAY ALTER NEURAL
INTERACTIONS
Further complicating our understanding of how different neural
regions interact with one another to shape our perceptions of the
social world, but immensely enriching it nonetheless, are recent
advances in the burgeoning field of genetics. While far less under-
stood, it is becoming clear that genetic polymorphisms in genes
integral for neural functionmoderate the interaction between and
within different neural regions involved in the processing of social
information. Perhaps one of the more provocative examples of
this stems from findings indicating that different polymorphisms
in the brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) gene, a gene
that promotes neuroplasticity throughout the brain, have been
associated with greater connectivity between and within differ-
ent neural regions. For instance, different BDNF polymorphisms
have been associated with increased connectivity between the
amygdala and VMPFC and subsequently individuals’ ability to
extinguish learned fear responses (Soliman et al., 2010). BDNF
induced plasticity within neural regions such as OFC and DLPFC
have also been found to moderate individuals’ ability to inhibit
implicit and explicit bias respectively (Forbes et al., 2012b).
Given the seemingly ubiquitous role of the amygdala, PFC
and amygdala-PFC connectivity in social cognition (e.g., stereo-
type activation and regulation, emotional expression and regula-
tion, perceptions of trustworthiness, attribution, attitudes, etc.),
BDNF-induced variation in plasticity may play an important role
in explaining individual differences between and within groups
on a variety of social psychological dimensions ranging from
prejudice to political orientation to moral judgment. One crit-
ical area for future research is determining how exactly BDNF
is modulating social cognitive processes. There are three par-
ticularly important questions that should be addressed. (1) Do
different BDNF polymorphisms alter the plasticity between rep-
resentations of a given construct like those between attributes
associated with a given ethnic group (i.e., actually strengthen
stereotypic associations)? (2) Do they alter plasticity within and
between regions that are necessary to regulate cognitive pro-
cesses? Or (3) Do they influence both equally or differentially?
Findings from Forbes et al. (2012b) provide evidence supporting
the second question, but much more research will be necessary to
fully understand how BDNF polymorphisms alter associative and
regulatory strength of social representations.
BDNF is not the only gene known to influence connectiv-
ity between the amygdala and other neural regions, however. In
addition to the effects of BDNF on amygdala-PFC connectivity,
polymorphisms in the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT)
and serotonin transporter gene have been shown to modulate
affective arousal and regulation as well as the retention of fear
extinguished memories (Drabant et al., 2006; Hartley et al., 2012).
While primarily studied within the context of affective disorders,
it is clear to see how these findings also have important impli-
cations for future work in social neuroscience. Given that many
social interactions are likely to initiate a cascade of implicit and
explicit processes that would invariably rely on amygdala-PFC
interactions, it stands to reason that polymorphisms in genes
such as COMT, serotonin and BDNF could have subtle influ-
ences on behavior in a given situation. For example, both blacks
and whites have been shown to establish learned fear responses to
novel members of their ethnic outgroup faster, and have greater
difficulty extinguishing these learned fear responses (Olsson et al.,
2005). Findings from the literature described above would sug-
gest then that some people would be either better or worse at
extinguishing the learned outgroup fear responses based on poly-
morphisms in COMT, serotonin and/or BDNF; a conjecture that
has direct implications for intergroup relations, prejudice and
prejudice reduction strategies.
These findings, and the current state of the field for that mat-
ter, represent the tip of the iceberg with many fruitful avenues for
future research. For example, current as well as future research
(including a study in this research topic: See Krueger et al., 2012)
is examining the role of polymorphisms in the oxytocin recep-
tor gene in facilitating trust and social bonds. This research will
likely shed light on individual differences in trustworthiness and
attachment, i.e., the foundations of human society. It is equally
likely that myriad discoveries of other genetic polymorphisms
are imminent and will undoubtedly impact the field of social
neuroscience in substantial ways.
Thus, the field of social neuroscience stands to benefit greatly
from analytical and theoretical advances in neuroscience and
cognitive neuroscience and should utilize the analytic strategies
mentioned above to inform theories integral to the field of social
psychology. In this vein, the field of social neuroscience has the
potential to make dramatic contributions to social psychological
theory. Articles in this research topic employ these methods
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and provide further evidence across a variety of domains in social
psychological research that supports this conjecture. Using EEG
methodologies to further blur the lines between implicit and
explicit processes, Forbes et al. (2012c) discuss EEG and lesion
studies that find surprising overlap and coherence between neu-
ral regions on tasks thought to uniquely recruit implicit and
explicit processes (the IAT). Similarly, Cunningham et al. (2012)
highlight the dynamic, context-dependent modulation of neural
processes involved in social perception in an EEG study that finds
that motivational orientation alters the rapid processing of eth-
nic ingroup and outgroup faces such that white and black faces
are perceived similarly when white individuals are motivated to
approach black faces. Providing further evidence for how the
interaction between implicit and explicit processes may modulate
person perception, Poore et al. (2012) report an fMRI study that
examines how implicit reward processing in the striatum predicts
decreases in explicit trust toward close others when individuals
received information from these sources that violated their expec-
tations. Harada et al. (2012) also use fMRI to demonstrate how
situational (perceived power) and sustained social factors (cul-
tural stereotypes) interact to modulate regions integral for both
math calculation and implicit and explicit processes. Beasley et al.
(2012) and Hecht et al. (2012) add breadth to our understanding
of the complexity of brain by situation interactions utilizing an
evolutionary approach.
Studies presented in this research topic also provide new
insight in to our understanding of the role genetic polymor-
phisms play in social cognition. Richter et al. (2011) demonstrate
that a polymorphism in AKAP5 is associated with both explicit
reports of aggressive behavior, anger expression and anger con-
trol, and implicit regulation of anger. These differences mani-
fested at the neural level as well, implicating enhanced activation
in ACC during the processing of angry faces among individuals
with the polymorphism associated with decreased aggression.
Specific to trust and the facilitation of social bonds, Krueger
et al. (2012) report a study that identifies different polymor-
phisms in the oxytocin receptor gene associated with trusting
behaviors specifically.While these findings undoubtedly represent
the gateway to understanding highly complex gene-environment
interactions, e.g., environmental exposures can also modulate the
instructions that go from the gene to the neuron and related cells
and essentially override a predisposition using epigenetic means
(Rutter et al., 2006), both studies nicely exhibit how genetic poly-
morphisms can nonetheless affect social behavior in meaningful
ways. Consistent with this, Falk et al. (2012) provide a critical
examination and organizing framework for understanding how
genetic polymorphisms that moderate neurochemical responses
in the brain may interact with known neural networks to predis-
pose individuals to social influences and conformity. Ratner and
Kubota (2012) also highlight the promise of genetic contributions
specific to the study of intergroup relations but eloquently, and
rightfully, stress caution in these approaches as well.
The research and reviews presented in this research topic rep-
resent the second phase of social neuroscience. That is, they focus
less on where things are happening in the brain and more on
how different neural regions interact as a function of context
and genetic predispositions almost instantaneously in a given
situation to modulate social perceptual processes and behavior.
While these forays will likely engender an appreciation of the
mind-numbing complexity of dynamic gene-neural-situational
interactions and their behavioral byproducts, the current steps
being made toward this progress are obviously imperative. As
such, this is an exciting time for social neuroscience as a field as
the products of these endeavors will no doubt have a dramatic
impact on theories integral for social and cognitive psychology
and neuroscience for years to come.
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